Abstract-The Internet of Things (IoT) is becoming an attractive system paradigm to realize interconnections through the physical, cyber, and social spaces. During the interactions among the ubiquitous things, security issues become noteworthy, and it is significant to establish enhanced solutions for security protection. In this work, we focus on an existing U2IoT architecture (i.e., unit IoT and ubiquitous IoT), to design an aggregated-proof based hierarchical authentication scheme (APHA) for the layered networks. Concretely, 1) the aggregated-proofs are established for multiple targets to achieve backward and forward anonymous data transmission; 2) the directed path descriptors, homomorphism functions, and Chebyshev chaotic maps are jointly applied for mutual authentication; 3) different access authorities are assigned to achieve hierarchical access control. Meanwhile, the BAN logic formal analysis is performed to prove that the proposed APHA has no obvious security defects, and it is potentially available for the U2IoT architecture and other IoT applications.
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INTRODUCTION
T HE Internet of Things (IoT) is emerging as an attractive system paradigm to integrate physical perceptions, cyber interactions, and social correlations, in which the physical objects, cyber entities, and social attributes are required to achieve interconnections with the embedded intelligence [1] . During the interconnections, the IoT is suffering from severe security challenges, and there are potential vulnerabilities due to the complicated networks referring to heterogeneous targets, sensors, and backend management systems [2] . It becomes noteworthy to address the security issues for the ubiquitous things in the IoT.
Recent studies have been worked on the general IoT, including system models, service platforms, infrastructure architectures, and standardization. Particularly, a human-society inspired U2IoT architecture (i.e., unit IoT and ubiquitous IoT) is proposed to achieve the physicalcyber-social convergence (as shown in Fig. 1 ) [3] . In the U2IoT architecture, mankind neural system and social organization framework are introduced to establish the single-application and multi-application IoT frameworks. Multiple unit IoTs compose a local IoT within a region, or an industrial IoT for an industry. The local IoTs and industrial IoTs are covered within a national IoT, and jointly form the ubiquitous IoT.
Towards the IoT security, related works mainly refer to the security architectures and recommended countermeasures [4] , [5] , [6] , [7] , [8] , secure communication and networking mechanisms [9] , [10] , [11] , [12] , [13] , cryptography algorithms [14] , [15] , [16] , [17] , [18] , [19] , and application security solutions [20] , [21] , [22] . Current researches mainly refer to three aspects: system security, network security, and application security.
System security mainly considers a whole IoT system to identify the unique security and privacy challenges, to design systemic security frameworks, and to provide security measures and guidelines. Network security mainly focuses on wireless communication networks (e.g., wireless sensor networks (WSN), radio frequency identification (RFID), and the Internet) to design key distribution algorithms, authentication protocols, advanced signature algorithms, access control mechanisms, and secure routing protocols. Particularly, authentication protocols are popular to address security and privacy issues in the IoT, and should be designed considering the things' heterogeneity and hierarchy. Application security serves for IoT applications (e.g., multimedia, smart home, and smart grid), and resolves practical problems with particular scenario requirements. However, the existing security solutions mainly provide security approaches for a general IoT, and there is little authentication scheme particularly designed for the U2IoT architecture. It becomes necessary to establish an authentication scheme to realize its security protection. In this work, the main purpose is to provide bottom-up safeguard for the U2IoT architecture to realize secure interactions.
Towards the U2IoT architecture, a reasonable authentication scheme should satisfy the following requirements. 1) Data CIA (i.e., confidentiality, integrity, and availability):
The exchanged messages between any two legal entities should be protected against illegal access and modification. The communication channels should be reliable for the legal entities. 2) Hierarchical access control: Diverse access authorities are assigned to different entities to provide hierarchical interactions. An unauthorised entity cannot access data exceeding its permission. 3) Forward security: Attackers cannot correlate any two communication sessions, and also cannot derive the previous interrogations according to the ongoing session. 4) Mutual authentication: The untrusted entities should pass each other's verification so that only the legal entity can access the networks for data acquisition. 5) Privacy preservation: The sensors cannot correlate or disclose an individual target's private information (e.g., location). Considering above security requirements, we design an aggregatedproof based hierarchical authentication scheme (APHA) for the unit IoT and ubiquitous IoT respectively, and the main contributions are as follows: 1) Aggregated-proofs are established by wrapping multiple targets' messages for anonymous data transmission, which realizes that individual information cannot be revealed during both backward and forward communication channels, 2) Directed path descriptors are defined based on homomorphism functions to establish correlation during the cross-layer interactions. Chebyshev chaotic maps are applied to describe the mapping relationships between the shared secrets and the path descriptors for mutual authentication, 3) Diverse access authorities on the group identifiers and pseudonyms are assigned to different entities for achieving the hierarchical access control through the layered networks. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the related work in the IoT security. Section 3 presents the layered system model, and introduces the proposed authentication scheme. Section 4 introduces the BAN logic based formal analysis. Finally, Section 5 draws a conclusion.
RELATED WORK 2.1 System Security
Roman et al. [4] pointed out that the traditional security mechanisms may not be competent for the heterogeneous networks, therefore improved mechanisms should be designed according to the IoT infrastructures. Particularly, the authors introduced cryptology based guidance to address the security challenges, referring to the identity management, trust governance frameworks, fault tolerance, cryptography protocol, identity ownership, and privacy preservation.
Lampropoulos and Denazis [5] focused on the identity management in future Internet to analyze the identification and authentication issues in the user-centric, federations, and other orthogonal systems. Furthermore, a distributed dynamic identity mapping, association N' discovery system (DIMANDS) was established to achieve cross-federation service delivery, and to authenticate an unknown entity in a foreign network and online service payment. The proposed DIMANDS can achieve trusted and secure associations in heterogeneous contexts.
Heer et al. [6] considered IP-based IoT, discussed the applicability and limitations of current Internet protocols, and presented a thing lifecycle based security architecture for the IP networks. Thereinto, security architecture, node security model, and security bootstrapping are considered in the security solution. Moreover, the authors pointed that the security protocols should fully consider the resource-constrained heterogeneous communication environments. Meca et al. [7] proposed a security architecture based on the host identity protocol (HIP) and multimedia Internet keying protocols to enhance secure network association and key management.
Ning et al. [8] addressed the cyber-entity security to present the recommended security approaches according to a cyber-entity's activity cycle, and further established a secure interaction solution for three scenarios (i.e., secure data access interaction, privacy-preserving data sharing interaction, and secure access authority transfer interaction).
Network Security
Hancke et al. [9] identified the security challenges for the user-oriented RFID systems in the IoT, and the major challenges (e.g., privacy, ownership, data integrity, application integrity, and security standardization) should be enhanced to achieve universal security. Yan and Wen [10] applied a mobile RFID security protocol to guarantee the mobile RFID networks, and a trust third party (TTP) based key management protocol is introduced to construct a secure session key. Toumi et al. [11] focused on the integration of RFID tags into IP networks, and proposed a HIP address translation scheme. The scheme provides address translation services between the tag identifiers and IP addresses, which presents a prototype of the cross-layer IoT networks. Chang and Chen [12] reviewed the trust-based mechanisms (e.g., cryptographic, and authentication) in WSNs. Raza et al. [13] presented Lithe, which is an integration of datagram transport layer security (DTLS) and constrained application protocol (CoAP) to protect the transmission of sensitive information in the IoT. Yao et al. [14] revised Nyberg's fast one-way accumulator to design a message authentication code (MAC) based multicast authentication mechanism for small-scale IoT applications. Roman et al. [15] considered WSNs to provide key management mechanisms to allow that two remote devices can negotiate certain security certificates (e.g., shared keys, Blom key pairs, and polynomial shares). The authors analyzed the applicability of existing mechanisms, including public key infrastructure (PKI) and pre-shared keys for sensor nodes in IoT contexts. Ren and Ma [16] proposed an attribute-based access control model according to bilinear mappings. The scheme realizes anonymous access, and minimizes the number of the exchanged messages in the open channels. Chen et al. [17] proposed a fuzzy reputation based trust management model (TRM-IoT) to enforce the entities' cooperation and interconnection. Wang et al. [18] proposed an anonymous authentication protocol, and applied the pseudonym and threshold secret sharing mechanism to achieve the tradeoff between anonymity and certification. Zhao et al. [19] proposed a mutual authentication scheme, which is designed based on the feature extraction, secure hash algorithm (SHA), and elliptic curve cryptography (ECC). Thereinto, asymmetric authentication scheme is established without compromising computation cost and communication overhead.
Application Security
Zhou and Chao [20] established a media-aware traffic security architecture for the IoT, and the architecture is based on the current traffic classification to enable the heterogeneous multimedia services becoming available in real-time mode. Concretely, key management, batch rekeying, authentication, watermarking, and distributed secret sharing are introduced into the security architecture.
Li et al. [21] established a smart community model for IoT applications, and a cyber-physical system with the networked smart homes was introduced with security considerations. Filtering false network traffic and avoiding unreliable home gateways are suggested for safeguard. Meanwhile, the security challenges are discussed, including the cooperative authentication, unreliable node detection, target tracking, and intrusion detection.
Sridhar et al. [22] analyzed cyber infrastructure security in the smart grid. A layered security scheme was established to evaluate security risks for the power applications. The authors highlighted power generation, transmission, distribution control and security, and introduced encryption, authentication, and access control to achieve secure communications. Furthermore, digital forensics, security incident and event management are applied for management, and cyber-security evaluation and intrusion tolerance are also considered.
3 THE AUTHENTICATION SCHEME: APHA
System Initialization
In the U2IoT architecture, the unit IoT refers to a basic network unit for a single application, and the ubiquitous IoT includes multiple applications within the centralized national management [3] . Here, we consider an industryoriented scenario, in which multiple industrial IoTs manage the corresponding unit IoTs in diverse industries (e.g., smart grid). Meanwhile, the industrial IoTs are under the jurisdiction of a national IoT to realize interconnections. In the system model, there are heterogeneous sensors (S) and targets (T ), which are various according to different scenarios. Multiple unit data centers (DC) are under a particular industrial IoT's jurisdiction, and industrial data centers (iDC) have relatively independent authorities on a certain DC. Meanwhile, the trusted national data center (nDC) is introduced to manage multiple iDCs.
Here, we consider fT j ; S b ; DC a g ðj ¼ f1; . . . ; JgÞ in the unit IoT, and fDC a ; iDC; nDCg in the ubiquitous IoT. Each entity stores its assigned group identifiers and pseudonyms, as shown in Table 1 . Meanwhile, the directed path descriptors are introduced as authentication operators, and owned by the subscript labeled entity to point to the superscript labeled entity. It means that p x y is owned by E y , and represents the path descriptor pointing from E y to E x . The detailed notations are introduced in Table 2 .
The APHA is designed based on two main cryptographic primitives: a homomorphism function F ð:Þ, and Chebyshev polynomials T Ã ð:Þ.
Towards the homomorphism function. According to Fermat's Little theorem: If q is a prime number, and x is not a multiple of q, thus x qÀ1 1 mod q. A homomorphism encryption algorithm can be designed as follows [23] .
1) Choose two large prime numbers p and q. and let n ¼ pq, in which n is a public number, and p and q are private numbers. 2) A real number x is in a plaintext with the effective decimal digits d for g 1 ðxÞ ¼ 10 d x. Here, jg 1 ðxÞj ðp À 1Þ=2, and g 2 ðg 1 ðxÞÞ 2 Z p . Define a homomorphism function F : F ðxÞ ¼ g 2 ðg 1 ðxÞÞ kðpÀ1Þþ1 mod n ¼ C.
3) The inverse operation F À1 ð:Þ satisfies that: 
Towards the Chebyshev polynomials. The Chebyshev chaotic maps can be applied for authentication [24] , [25] . Assume that T l ðmÞ is a Chebyshev polynomial in l of degree m, and T l ðmÞ : ½À1; 1 ! ½À1; 1 is defined as T l ðmÞ ¼ cosðl Á arccosðmÞÞ. The recurrence relationships of Chebyshev polynomials are as follows:
T 1 ðmÞ ¼ m; T l ðmÞ ¼ cosðl Á arccosðmÞÞ; ðl ! 2Þ:
Let the degrees {l 1 ; l 2 } be positive integer numbers. The Chebyshev polynomials T l 1 ðmÞ and T l 2 ðmÞ (m 2 ½À1; 1) satisfy the semigroup and chaotic properties:
T l ðmÞ ð2mT lÀ1 ðmÞ À T lÀ2 ðmÞÞ ðmod qÞ ; ðl ! 2Þ;
Accordingly, a set of Chebyshev polynomials are assigned to represent the relationships of the group identifiers/pseudonyms and directed path descriptors:
Besides, the group identifiers {gid iDC ; gid DCa } can be respectively extended into fgid n iDC g (i.e., {gid In the trust model, nDC is an only entity trusted by all the other entities (i.e., T j ; S b ; DC a ; iDC). In the unit IoT, DC a is trusted by {T j ; S b }, and is under iDC's default jurisdiction. In the ubiquitous IoT, iDC and nDC have relatively independent jurisdictions on DC a . Chebyshev polynomial T x ð:Þ. T j updates {p
The Authentication Protocol in the Unit IoT
T j computes M T j and V T j , in which M T j is an authentication operator, and V T j is further used to establish the backward aggregated-proof AP b :
¼ M T j holds, S b will regard T j as a legal target; otherwise, the APHA will terminate. 
, DC a will regard T j as a legal target; otherwise, the APHA will terminate: 
T j computes jp jb aj j and gid
. Here, jp jb aj j is a mirroring directed path descriptor from DC a to S b via T j :
Afterwards, T j extracts gid S b to check the validity of S b by
holds, T j will regard S b as a legal sensor; otherwise, the APHA will terminate. Till now, S b and T j have established the mutual authentication, and DC a has authenticated {T j ; S b } as legal entities. The backward and forward aggregated-proofs are respectively established to wrap multiple targets {T 1 ; . . . ; T J }'s identity related information.
The Authentication Protocol in the Ubiquitous
IoT Fig. 3 shows an interaction among {DC a ; iDC; nDC}, in which DC a is under iDC's jurisdiction, and {DC a ; iDC} are within nDC's management range. 
nDC ascertains {iDC; DC a }'s identities according to {F iDC ; F DCa }, and extracts {' nDC ; gid iDC ; PID DCa ; C i n ; p i n ; k n } to re-compute {PID iDC and DC a as legal entities; otherwise, the APHA will terminate:
Till now, DC a and iDC have established mutual authentication, and nDC has authenticated {DC a ; iDC} as legal entities. Thereinto, iDC and nDC have different access authorities on DC a 's group identifier and pseudonym to achieve hierarchical access control.
Security Properties 3.4.1 Data Confidentiality and Data Integrity
Data confidentiality is mainly achieved by the Chebyshev chaotic maps, in which the polynomials {T l T j ; T l S b ; T l DCa ; T l iDC ; T l nDC } are defined to represent the relationships of the group identifiers, pseudonyms and directed path descriptors. During the maps, the directed path descriptors are wrapped by the homomorphism function F ð:Þ. Besides, the pseudo-random numbers (i.e., r T j ; r S b ; r DC a ; r iDC ) are applied to obtain the degree of the Chebyshev polynomials {T x ; T y ; T u ; T v } for enhancing session randomization. 
Hierarchical Access Control
Two-layered interactions of {T j ; S b ; DC a } and {DC a ; iDC; nDC} are performed in relatively independent modes, during which DC a acts as a media to connect the unit IoT and ubiquitous IoT. According to the practical application requirements, {T j ; S b ; DC a ; iDC; nDC} are assigned the different access authorities in the U2IoT.
For T j . T j owns S b 's group identifier gid S b to ascertain the general group attribute, and ensure that only an in-group sensor can access T j 's data. For S b . S b can only determine T j 's group identifier gid T j by the challenged pseudo-random identity flag F T j without obtaining the pseudonym PID T j to restrain S b 's access authority on T j . For DC a . In the unit IoT, DC a owns reinforced access authorities on {T j ; S b }, and can ascertain {T j ; S b }'s detailed group identifiers {gid T j ; gid S b } based on the flags. Additionally, DC a can further determine {T j ; S b }'s pseudonyms {PID T j ; PID S b } for further management. In the ubiquitous IoT, DC a owns iDC's group identifier gid iDC to ensure that only the industrial data center with the appointed group identifier can access DC a 's data. For iDC. iDC owns DC a 's pseudonym PID DC a to realize that iDC can ascertain DC a 's detailed identity in an industry application. For nDC. nDC owns access authorities on both unit IoT and industrial IoT. DC a 's pseudonym PID DC a and iDC's group identifier gid iDC are available to realize the centralized management.
Forward Unlinkability
The pseudo-random numbers are generated as session-sensitive operators to provide session freshness and randomization. Additionally, the identity related values (e.g., identify flags, group identifier, and pseudonym) are dynamically updated during each session. Such variables are applied to obtain the authentication operators (e.g., V T j ; M S b ; M DC a , and V iDC ), the aggregated-proofs, and other intermediate variables (e.g., V S b ). The transmitted messages are mainly computed based on the random numbers {r T j ; r S b ; r DCa ; r iDC }, which make that the exchanged messages can be regarded as dynamically variables with perfect forward unlinkability, and an attacker cannot correlate the ongoing session with former sessions in the open channels.
Mutual Authentication
In the unit IoT, the mutual authentication is established between T j and S b , and authentication operators are applied to check the identity correctness and consistency. The Chebyshev chaotic maps gid T j T l S b ðF ðp In the ubiquitous IoT, hybrid authentications are established among {DC a ; iDC; nDC}. The Chebyshev chaotic maps {T l DCa ; T l iDC ; T l nDC } are introduced for authentication. Besides, the group identifiers {gid iDC ; gid DC a } can be extended into {gid 
Privacy Preservation
The backward aggregated-proof AP b is established by S b to wrap multiple targets {T 1 ; . . . ; T J }'s identity related values, and the cascaded value J The aggregated-proofs have two main functions: one is to pack multiple targets' challenges into a group, and the other is to pack DC a 's responses into a group. Such aggregated data transmission realizes that {T j }'s individual identity related information cannot be revealed, and attackers cannot derive individual sensitive information according to the intercepted messages. It turns out that only the legal unit data center can derive each target's identity information by AP b , and only the legal target can derive its authorized fields by AP f .
FORMAL ANALYSIS WITH THE BAN LOGIC
In this section, Burrows-Abadi-Needham (i.e., BAN) logic [26] is applied to analyze the design correctness for security proof, and it is a rigorous evaluation method to detect subtle defects for authentication scheme. The formal analysis focuses on belief and freshness, involving the following steps: message formalization, initial assumptions declaration, anticipant goals declaration, and logic verification. Table 3 shows formal notations in the BAN logic.
Message Formalization
Message formalization is to specify the exchanged messages. In the unit IoT, the formalized messages among {DC a ; S b ; T j } are obtained as follows:
In the ubiquitous IoT, the formalized messages among {DC a ; iDC; nDC} are obtained as follows:
M2.1: iDC C r DC a ; iDC C F DC a ; M2.2: DC a C r iDC ; DC a C F iDC ; DC a C r DCa ; p 
Initial Assumptions
In the APHA, an entity believes that: 1) the shared secrets and keys are obtained by the assigned entities, 2) the pseudo random numbers, identity flags, pseudonyms, and directed path descriptors are fresh, and 3) the trusted entity has jurisdiction on the entitled values. The initiative assumptions, including initial possessions and entity abilities are obtained as follows: For DC a : 
Anticipant Goals
The security goals refer to belief and freshness, in which the exchanged messages are transmitted from authenticated entities, and the messages were never used in former sessions. In the APHA, the anticipant goals are obtained as follows:
In the unit IoT: G1.1: 
In the ubiquitous IoT: G2.1: DC a j iDC j $ ðp 
Logic Verification
Logic verification is performed according to the formalized messages, initial assumptions, and the related rules of the BAN logic. . Applying the message-meaning rule (RM3):
we obtain that,
If T j believes that C ; T j will believe that S b once conveyed the message ðr T j ; p j b Þ. Thereafter, applying the belief rule (RB4): P j Q j $ðX;Y Þ P j Q j $X , we obtain that,
If T j believes that S b conveyed the message ðr T j ; p j b Þ; T j will believe that S b conveyed the sub-message p j b . Note that the postulate is sound because the rules for C guarantee that p j b was not just uttered by T j . Till now, G1.1 has been proven, and G1.3, G1.6, G1.7, G2.3, and G2.6 can be achieved via the similar procedures. According to M2.2: DC a C fr DCa ; PID iDC g ka , it turns out that DC a receives fr DCa ; PID iDC g ka , in which a secret key k a is applied for establishing the ciphertext. Applying the message-meaning rule (RM1):
, we obtain that, DC a j iDC j $ ðr DC a ; PID iDC Þ:
If DC a believes that k a is a shared key with iDC, and DC a receives the wrapped message fr DCa ; PID iDC g k a ; DC a will believe that S b conveyed ðr DCa ; PID iDC Þ. Applying the belief rule (RB4):
P j Q j $ðX;Y Þ P j Q j $X , we obtain that,
If DC a believes that S b once conveyed the message ðr DCa ; PID iDC Þ; DC a will believe that S b conveyed the sub-message PID iDC . Till now, G2.1 has been proven, and G2.7 can be achieved via the similar procedures. If T j believes that {r T j ; PID T j } are fresh, T j will also believe that V S b is fresh. Till now, G1.2 has been proven, and G1.4, G2.2, and G2.4 can be achieved via the similar procedures. t u Theorem 3. S b believes that gid T j and PID T j are secrets shared by {DC a ; T j }.
Proof. According to the secure communication channel between S b and DC a , we obtain that, S b j DC a j ) ðDC a j ÃÞ; S b j DC a j ðDC a j ÃÞ:
According to P3.1: DC a j T j () gid T j ;PID T j DC a , it turns out that DC a believes that {gid T j ; PID T j } are shared by {DC a ; T j }. Applying the secret sharing rule (RK3):
We obtain that DC a j DC a () gid T j ;PID T j T j . According to S b j DC a j ) ðDC a j ÃÞ and S b j DC a j ðDC a j ÃÞ, we obtain that, Thereafter, applying the jurisdiction rule (RJ1):
P j Q j )X;P j Q j X P j X
, we obtain that, S b j DC a () gid T j ;PID T j T j :
If S b believes that DC a is trusted, S b believes that DC a believes that the secrets {gid T j ; PID T j } are shared by {DC a ; T j }, and S b believes that DC a has jurisdiction over DCa () F MC aj T j ;S b will trust DC a on the truth of DCa () F MC aj T j . Till now, G1.5 has been proven, and G2.5 can be achieved via the similar procedures.
Thus, the BAN logic based security proof is demonstrated for formal analysis. In APHA, {T j ; S b } and {DC a ; iDC} can respectively establish beliefs via the mutual authentication, and the APHA is proved to be correct and ensures nonexistence of obvious design defects. t u
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed an aggregated-proof based hierarchical authentication scheme for the U2IoT architecture. In the APHA, two sub-protocols are respectively designed for the unit IoT and ubiquitous IoT to provide bottom-up security protection. The proposed scheme realizes data confidentiality and data integrity by the directed path descriptor and homomorphism based Chebyshev chaotic maps, establishes trust relationships via the lightweight mechanisms, and applies dynamically hashed values to achieve session freshness. It indicates that the APHA is suitable for the U2IoT architecture.
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